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October Term. I97G
No. 76-5729

Mark David Oliphant and Daniel B. Belgarde,
Petitioners,
v.
The Suquamish Indian Tribe, et al.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Brief for the Vie Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation,
As Amicus Curiae

Pursuant to Rule 42<2; of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, this brief is tiled
pursuant to consent of the parties evidenced by letters
of consent previous)v filed with the Clerk of thi* Court.

Interest pf-A)iiicuf> Cunac
Amicus Curiae the L'te Indian Tribe of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation (herein referred to as the "Ute
Tribe") is a iederallv recognized, self-sovernins American Indian Tribe organized oursuant to federal law
and located on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation in
north-eastern Utah.
Pursuant to authoritv granted bv its Tribal C-institution tsee 25 U.S.C. §476), the Vie Tribe has
adopted a Law and Order Code which asserts jurisdiction in its Tribal Courts for all civil and criminal
matters occurring within the exterior boundaries of the
Tribe's Reservation whenever the action involves,
"either the Tribe, its officers, agents, employees,
property, or enterprises, or a u^Uiatr ui u.-e
Tribe, or a member of a federally recognized
tribe, . . . if the matter is . . . one in which the
rights of the Tribe or its members may be directly or indirectly affected (Ute Law and
Order Code, §1-2-5, adopted April 11. 1975;
effective date. September 15, 1975).
Such jurisdiction has been challenged generally by the
State of Utah in a lawsuit now pending before the
Utah Federal District Court. Such jurisdiction, insofar as it extends to non-Indians in criminal cases, has
been specifically challenged by two non-Indians
arrested by the Ute Tribe for trespassing on Tribal
trust lands during the Fail 197C deer hunting season.
These non-Indians have filed a petition for federal
habeas corpus relief from Tribal Court jurisdiction in
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the same Utah Federal District" Court,, which petition
is now pending action by the Court. The issue of civil
jurisdiction by the Ute Tribe over non-Indians was an
underlying issue in the case of Brough v. Appawora.
553 P.2d 934 (Utah S.Ct. 1976), recently vacated
and remanded by order of this Court. See Appawora
v. Brough, ...... U.S
(52 L.Ed.2d 384), dated
May 2, 1977.
The Ute Tribe has an immediate and fundamental
concern for the issues raised herein. This brief is submitted in support of the position taken by the appellee
Suquamish Indian Tribe.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Ute Tribe believes that the majority opinion of
U i C V_A> JT*. OT I ~ cL,'vi2J>

^*:.w\i

*_dx> |j-_v--'f.-wii\

cu»£iiyi.vU

lilt?

issues presented herein and has reached the correct decision in affirming the jurisdiction of the respondent Indian tribe over non-Indians for criminal conduct, occurring on an Indian reservation, which affects the governmental interests of the tribe and the peace and safety of
its members. Such conclusion is correct both as to offenses occurring on tribal ("trust") lands as well as on
non-Indian roads and rights-of-way running through the
reservation.
The Ute Tribe believes that the doctrine of inherent, residual tribal sovereignty provides the appropriate
analytical context for deciding this case. Xo federal laws
Ean be found which expressly remove jurisdiction over
non-Indians from the realm of tribal sovereignty, and
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established constructional canons relating to Indian legislation should be applied to prevent the speculative or
inferential expansion of federal criminal laws dealing
with Indian reservations. Tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians has remained dormant as the result of administrative suppression, not its non-existence. Such jurisdiction has not been lost by past non-user. Its exercise
under conditions prevailing on most reservations has become a practical necessity.
Amicus curiae, The Ute Tribe, submits that the recent cases of this Court provide a workable test to be
applied in delineating the extent of Indian tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. That test, in the
nature of a "minimum contact" ^nalvsis. would permit
Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians "insofar as concerns their transactions [and conduct] on a reservation with Indians [and recognized
tribal interests, such as the peace, health, safety and welfare of Indian communities]." Such test is found in this
Court's characterization of the rule of Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959), contained in the case of United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 558 (1975).
Argument
I
T H I S COURT H A S RECOGNIZED T H A T
T R I B A L COURT JURISDICTION CAN
P R O P E R L Y E X T E N D TO N O N - I N D I A N S
I N R E L A T I O N TO T H E I R C O N D U C T O N
AN I N D I A N RESERVATION W I T H INDIANS.

y

This courts opinion in United Slates v. Mazuric,
419 U.S. 544 (1975), considered whether or not nonIndian defendants could be prosecuted in federal court:
under 18 U . S . C §1I(>1 for failing to comply with tribal
alcoholic beverage licensing; regulations of the Wind
River Tribes in Wyoming. In reply to the contention
that it was unfair to subject the non-Indians to regulation by a tribe, in whose government they could not,
as non-Indians, participate, this Court replied as follows:
The fact that the Mazuries could not become
members of the tribe, and therefore could not
participate in the tribal government, does not
alter our conclusion. This claim, that because
respondents are non-Indians Congress could not
:A;D}cCi tricJi, to \zz ;i*uthcrity oi t^e Tn&al Council with respect to the sale of liquor* is answered
by this Court's opinion in Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 79 S.Ct. 269 (J959).
In holding that the autJierity of tribal courts
could extend over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their transactions on a reservation with
Indians, wre stated:
"It is immaterial that respondent is not an
Indian. He was on the Reservation and the
transaction with an Indian took place there. The
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the
authoritv of Indian governments over their
reservations. Congress recognized this authority
in the Navajos in the Treaty* of 1868, and has
done so ever since. If this power is to be taken
away from them, it is for Congress to do it. {419
U.S. at 557-8} [Emphasis added.]
The cited case of William v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217

11959), has been characterized by this Court as a
"landmark decision/' See McClanahan c. Arizona Tax
Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973). The McClanahan case quotes with approval the following from Williams v. Lee, ielating directly to the issue of Indian
tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians herein:
Over the years this Court has modified [the
tribal sovereignty principle] in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where
the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized
. . . Thus, suits by Indians against outsiders in
state courts have been sanctioned . . . And state
courts have been allowed to try n on-Indians who
committed crimes against each other on a reservation . . • But if the crime teas by or a^iiim an
Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained
exclusive. . . . Essentially, absent governing Acts
of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them." {McClanahan, 411 U.S. at
171-2, quoting from Williams v. Lee, 3.38 U.S.
at 219-20) [Emphasis added.]
While the McClanahan and Williams cases dealt
with state taxation and state court civil jurisdiction over
reservation Indians, respectively, it is significant that
both cases have restated that "crimes bv or against an
Indian" are to be handled in either tribal or federal
courts. In order for the phrase "against an Indian" to
be meaningful, it must include offenses by a non-Indian
against an Indian, since offenses "bv an Indian" against
another Indian would alreadv be covered under the

7
category of offenses "bv . . . an'Indian", ihe oniv exception to tlie exclusive tribal-federal court jurisdiction
would be offenses bv a non-Indian against a nonIndian; the other combinations, Indian against Indian,
Indian against non-Indian, and non-Indian against Indian, all come within the phrase "by or against an Indian" for which tribal jurisdiction is exclusive absent
an express Congressional delegation to another forum.
Such an analysis is consistent with the characterization
of the Williams v. Lee rule contained in United States
v. Mazurie, supra, 419 U.S. at 5.58:
that the authority of tribal courts would extend
over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their
transactions on a reservation with Indians.
W e submit that this last stated formulation provides a reasonable test and standard to be applied in
defining the limits of tribal court jurisdiction over nonIndians. It wrould exempt from tribal court jurisdiction
conduct in which the Indians or their tribe have no
particular concern (e.g., crimes involving only nonIndians), while allowing Indian tribes to exercise governmental powers in matters involving members of the
tribe and threats to the property, peace, health, safety,
and welfare of the tribe and its members. As noted
above under "Interest of Amicus Curiae/' this is the
jiirisdich'onal approach which the Ute Tribe, amicus
curiae hereof, has taken.
Such a standard can be reasonably analogized to
established bases for finding jurisdiction in other contexts. For example, can it not be said that the act of

s
committing an offense against an Indian on a ref-ervation or committing a breach of the .peace or other disruptive conduct within an Indian reservation constitutes sufficient:
minimum contacts with [the tribe] such that die
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fcvir play j.nd substantial justice" (International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 314 316 (1945)?
This standard ("transactions on a reservation with
Indians"), though necessarily general in its pronouncement, can be refined and applied to die specific circumstances of each case by the judges, both tribal and
otherwise, to whom the question is presented. Congress has imposed upon tribal courts the federal standards of both due process of law and equal protection
of the laws, as well as specific re^uieiions Eclating io
criminal procedures. See 25 U.S.C. §1302. Habeas
corpus relief is available in federal courts to test the
procedures of the tribal courts as applied to both Indians and non-Indians. See 25 U.S.C. §1303. Such
protections extend to "persons," not merely to "Indians."
See Point I I I herein below.
Certainly under the operative facts in the instant
case it cannot be said to be unfair or unjust to subject
Mr. Oliphant to tribal prosecution for his assaulting
tribal police officers on Indian trast property during a
tribal celebration. Likewise, in the case of Mr. Belgarde, it cannot be said to be unfair or unjust to subject
him to tribal prosecution after he had been racing reck-

9

lessly through the streets of ai, .ludiyj cn-inunity, witli
tribal officers in pursuit for several hours. Such contacts are far more than minimal; they are recognized
as breaches of the peace under any standard of law.
Is it any less fair to apply the standards which govern
Indian conduct off a reservation to non-Indian conduct
on a reservation?
Absent express federal laws to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have
generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory
state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of
the state. Mescalero Apaclie Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145, 148-9 (1973).
The concept of residual, inherent sovereignty provides the theoretical basis for tribal court jurisdiction
over non-Indians (see Point I I I below); the recent decisions of this Court vyro^e 4 he luck'cial precedent for
extending such jurisdiction to criminal as well as civil
actions. The repeated recognition of the "right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them" (William v. Lee, supra, 358 U.S. at 220)
recognizes this power as a sovereign right one which, if
enforceable only against a portion of those who would
break tribal laws, would be an empty right indeed. For
if "self-determination" and "internal sovereignty" are to
have any meaning, they must include the power to preserve the peace and order of the society possessing
these powers. As in the case of other sovereignties,
such as the States:
The power and duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect

iO

the privacy, the lives, and the property of its
residents cannot be doubted. ( Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940)).
This concept was recognized by the Court of Appeals
below when it observed that:
Surely the power to preserve order on the reservation, when necessary by punishing those who
violate tribal law, is a sine qua non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed.
Oliphant v. Schlie, 5U F.2d 1007,' 1009 (9th
Cir. 1976).
To deny such fundamental attributes of sovereignty
to Indian tribes would be to render their sovereignty
meaningless, placing them at the mercy of persons
whom they cannot control, having to look for protection
from federal officials ->vho c£en display indifference in
becoming involved in another petty "Indian" case. For
many Indian reservations, it is unfortunately still true
in large measure as it was in the last century, that:
They [the Indian tribes] owe no allegiance to
the States, and receive from them no protection.
Because of local ill feeling, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 385 (1886).
Effective law enforcement by federal officials is
virtually non-existent on most Indian reservations. Federal investigate, prosecutorial and judicial authorities
are generally far removed from Indian reservations,
both physically and culturally. It is virtually impossible
for most tribes to obtain federal prosecution of the
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multitude of relatively minor, vet socially disruptive offenses, such as those committed by Messrs. Oliphant
and Belgarde. As a practical matter, if the Indian tribes
are held to have no jur.vliction over such offenses by
non-Indians, the reservations will be converted from
reserves for the benefit of the Indians to havens for the
lawless among the whites. Such a result is inconsistent
with Congressional policy, concepts of federal guardianship, and the precedents of this Court which "have
consistendy guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations." (Williams v. Lee, supra,
358 U.S. at 223).

II
THE OFFENSES OCCURRED WITHIN
INDIAN COUNT!**" A N D A K E x'KuPERLY WITHIN TRIBAL JURISDICTION
The authority of an Indian tribe inhabiting an Indian resenation is geographically coextensive with the
boundaries of that reservation, regardless of the ownership status of lands therein. Just as a state may define offenses occurring on private roads or other property within its boundaries, so may an Indian tribe.
I t is the existence of an exterior leservation boundary
that defines the territorial extent of tribal jurisdiction,
not the tide status of each parcel of property therein.
Such an approach is not only consistent with common sense, but with federal law as well. 18 U.S.C.
§1151 defines "Indian Country" as follows:
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Except as otherwise provided in sections 11.3-1
and 115G of this tide, the term "Indian country",
as used in this chapter, means (a) ail land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States
Government,
netwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within
or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same. [Emphasis added.]
As noted in this Court's opinion in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975):
If the lands in question are within a continuing
"reservation," jurisdiction is in the tribe and the
Federal Government "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, [such jurisdiction] including
rghits-of-way running through the reservation."
18 U.S.C. §1151 (a) . . . While §1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generally
applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.
Thus, the concept of "Indian country" as defined
in 18 U.S.C. §1151 is definitive of the territorial extent
of Indian tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction. There
can be no reasonable question that Mr. Oliphant's alleged criminal conduct occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Suquarnish Tribe, as his offense occurred on Tribal lands (lands held in trust for the
Tribe bv the United States). Mr. Bel garde's offense
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occurred on a state highway and a count)- load within
the exterior boundaries of the Tribe's recognized reservation. As developed above, such "rights-of-way" are a
part of "Indian country" and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe. As the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has previously held in a case involving the
authority of a tribal officer to stop and search a vehicle
on a state highway running through an Indian reservation :
[ W ] e note that the fact that the events of interest here may have occurred within the rightof-way for a state highway avails the defendant
nothing. .Rights of way running through a
reservation remain part of the reservation and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the tribal
police. See, Gc-mecu v. S^n'iK 207 N . W ?d
256 (NJDaL 1973); 18 U.S.C. §1151 (1970).
Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176,
1180 (9th Cir. 1975).
Ill
T H E (COURT O F A P P E A L S ' R E S I D U A L
SOVEREIGNTY A N A L Y S I S IS CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING LAW
The long-standing decisions of this Court recognizing Indian tribal sovereignty have received recent
reaffirmation. In declaring the inability of states to
collect taxes on Indian Income earned on a reservation,
this Court has declared as follows:
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant,
then, not because it provides a definitive resolu-
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tion of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read. It
must always be remembered that the various
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty
long predates that of our own Government . . .
But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the
last century, that ~[t]he relation of the Indian
tribes living within the borders of the United
States . . . [is] an anomalous one and of a complex character . . . They were, and always have
been, regarded as having a semi-independent
position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as SLties, zoi as -.:Mz^$9 not o^ possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but
as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus
far not brought under the laws of the Union or
of the State within whose limits they resided."
United States v. Kagima, 118 U.S., at 381-882,
30 L.Ed. 228. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172-3 (1973) [Emphasis added.]
See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975).
The dissent in the Olipliant opinion characterizes
tribal "sovereignty" as "merely a veil used where the
issue is, in fact, one of federal preemption of regulation in the field of Indian affairs.*' (Oliphant, supra,
544 F.2d at 1015). H e has confused the "backdrop*
referred to in McClnnahan, supra, which set the stage
for consideration and provides a point of reference from
which to begin analysis, with the curtain ("veil") which
obscures the stage from view. Tribal sovereigntv is far
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more than a mere analytical tool; it is a venerable doctrine fundamental to the entire field of Indian: law.
As one example of how tribal sovereignty continues as a vital precept of Indian law, we cite the following as indicative of its pervasive and fundamental
nature. Very recently, this Court has reconfirmed that
Indian tribes possess sufficient sovereignty to immunize
them from unconsented suite in state courts. See Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game,
. U.S
(45
U.S.L.W. 4837, June 23, 1977) citing United States
v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S.
506 (1939).
Congress has likewise recently recognized that such
sovereign rnimmiiiy is an inherent and residual characteristic of Indian tribes. See 25 U.S.C. §450n:
Nothing in this Act [the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975]
shall be construed as—(1) affecting, modifying,
diminishing, or otherwise impairing the sovereign
immunity from suit enjoyed by an Indian
tribe;...
Sovereign immunity for Indian tribes is a residual concept; the tribes are immune from suit because they were
originally so as sovereign entities and this attribute of
sovereignty has and will continue, until modified by the
Congress on behalf of the now dominant sovereign, the
United States. 25 U.S.C. §450n does not grant sovereign immunity, it recognizes it as already existing.
This Indian Self-Determination and Education As-

16
sistance Act of 1975 (25 U.S.C. §150 ct scq.) provides
additional L. sights into the residua] [ndian sovereignty
concept Given Congress' recognized plenary authority
over Indian affairs (see, e.g., Winton v. Amos, 255
U.S. 373, 391 (1921), and Delaiiare Tribal Business
Coram, v. Weeks,
U.S
(51 L.Ed. 2d 173, 1823) (1977)), the recent considered findings and pronouncements of the Congress should be entitled to seri/ous consideration. The "Congressional statement of
findings" accompanying this 1975 Act is instructive in
several particulars relevant hereto.
. •_
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Federal Government's historical and special legal
relationship with, and resulting responsibilities
to, American Indian people, finds that—
(1) the prolonged Federal domination of
Indian service programs Las served to retard
rather than enhance the progress of Indian
people and their communities hy depriving
Indians* of the full opportunity to develop
leadership skills crucial to the realization of
self-government, and has denied to the Indian
people an effective voice in the planning and
implementation of programs for the benefit of
Indians which are responsive to the true needs
of Indian communities: and
(2) the Indian people a ill nez.r surrender
their desire to control their relationship both
among themselves and iviih non-Indian governments, organizations, end persons. (25
U.S.C. §450) [Emphasis added.]
Xot only has the Congress recognized the existence of

a. continuing Indian "desire' to' control relationships
witth "non-Indian
perse is/* but such desire is linked
to the concept of self-government and self-determination. The following section of this 1975 Act, 25 U.S.C.
§150a, contains a "Congressional declaration of policy"
which states, amon? other things, that, "The Congress
hereby recognizes the obligation of the ITnited States
to respond to the strong expression of die Indian people
for self-determination . . ." (25 U.S.C. §450a(a)).
The question of "The status of Indian tribes" has
been used by this Court as a recognized example of a
non-judicially reviewable pob'tical question. See Baker
a Cart, 389 U.S. 186, 215-6 (1962). See also, e.g.,
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
The Indian Self-Determination and Educational Asaffirmation of residual tribal sovereignty as an attribute
of Indian tribal status. Prior acts, relating to Indians
generally, have been similarly framed. See, e.g., Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization (or WheelerHoward) Act of June 18, 1934 dealing with the "Organization of Indian Tribes": " . . . In addition to all
powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by
existing law, . . /' (25 U.S.C. §476)
The more recent so-called Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 (25 U.S.C. §§1301-1803, especially 1302) provides an interesting contrast to dissenting Judge Kennedv's analvsis of 18 U.S.C. §§11.52 and 1153. H e reasons that because these earlier acts specifically refer to
"Indians" in defining their scope and limits, that Con-

IS
gress must have assumed that tribal courts could not
exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian*. See Olipliant,
supra, 544 F.2d at 1015-1018. By contrast, both of
sections 1302 and 1303 of Title 25, United States Code,
refer to the rights of "persons" as opposed to "Indians"
in reference to official actions by Indian tribes. For
example, 25 U.S.C. §1303 provides;
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be available to any person, in a court of the
United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe. [Emphasis

added.]
25 U.S.C. §1302 spells out constitutional type rights as
limitations on the powers of Indian tribes:
Xo Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall:
(3) subject any person for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself;
(5) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding

(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of its laws or deprive any
person of liberty or property7 without due process of law;
*

*

*

^10) deny to any parson accused of an offense

iy
punishable bv imprisonment the rij^ht, upon request io a trial by jury of not less than six
persons.
As recently as 19CS, Congress has, by this Act, recognized that tlie "powers of self-government" of an Indian
tribe can extend to "any person" and that such "persons'* are protected in numerous areas exclusively and
expressly related to criminal procedures. The cases
which have considered the applicability of the protections of the Indian Civil Rights Act to non-Indians
have found them to apply, noting thai the substitute
bill which was offered (in the basic form subsequently
enacted), had originally referred to "American Indians'9
in delineating the beneficiaries of the rights to be established. This phrase was dropped in a later revision of
the substitute bill which substituted the phrase "any
i>d\>C/-ii j.or ^--jLiJucrjGari xi^ijuxin, WILR tu.e ixi ie/u to estaolish rights for all persons who may be subject to the
jurisdiction of tribal governments, whether Indians or
non-Indians" (Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F.Supp. 17, 24
(D.Ariz. 1968)). See also Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
United States, 515 F.2d 926, 934 n.8 (10th Cir. 1975);
Schantz v. White Lightning, 302 F.2d 67, 70 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1974); Hickey c. Crow Creek Housing
Authority,
379 F.Supp. 1002 (D.S.Dak. 1974). W e submit that
as has been held in affirming certain implied powers
of the United States, the imposition of a limitation on a
power is "but an implied assertion" of the existence of
the power. See, e.g., Kohl r. United States, 91 U.S.
367, 371-72 (1876/ regarding the power of eminent
domain as implied from the Fifth Amendment limitation thereon regarding the payment of just compensa-
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tibn. Congress has impliedly :c;c :uized the existence
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by imposing limitations on the criminal procedures which
can be applied to non-Indians and providing them with
a federal habeas corpus remedy to test "the legality of
their detention" under Trihrd jurisdiction.
Indeed, this-Court has recently considered the legislative intent behind 18 U.S.C. 1153 and concluded as
follows:
In short, Congress extended federal jurisdiction to crimes committed by Indians on Indian
land out of a conviction that many Indians would
"be civilized a great deal sooner by being put
under [federal criminal] laws and taught to regard life and the oersonsl property of others."
That is emphaUcaUy not to say, however, that
Congress intended to deprive Indian defendants
of procedural rights guaranteed to other defendants
Keeble tx United States, 412 U.S. 205,
211-12 (1973).
The majority opinion's concluding paragraph in Keeble
expressly recognizes tribal criminal jurisdiction as an
inherent, residual concept:
Finally, we emphasize that our decision today
neither expands the reach of the Major Crimes
Act nor permits the government to infringe the
residual jurisdiction of a tribe by bringing prosecutions in federal court that are not authorized
by statute. Id at 214. [Emphasis added.]
In a subsequent case considering the history of 18
U.S.C. §1153, this Court notes the position of the

:i
.United States regard in <: the Con_::ec>;"}n^] intent of' ihe
Jtfaior Cricnes Act:'
[ T j h e Government [in Kccblc] has characterized the Major Crimes Act as "a carefully
lirn[Uj_ intrusion of federal power into the otherw^elnvcTusiv;e.^
of the Indian bibes to
punish Indians for cringes committed on Indian
h:^s. CrAicd States v. Ar.icL->ve,
l\S
(51 L.Ed.2d 701, 705 n.l) (1977).
Such limited Concessional intent should not be
broadly expanded to include limitations on jurisdiction
over non-Indians, particulirly in light of the "eminently
sound and vital canon* which requires that "statutes
passed for the benefit ofTndians are to be liberally construed and all doubts are to be resolved in their favor."
See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. HoUowbrebst, 425
U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976).
-*
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ceived contiriiied recognition from the Executive branch
of the Federal Government as well. In an opinion entitled "Powers of Indian T;:bes," dated October 2 5,
1i?3t. isttd bv the Solid Mr of the Dcnci ;T;,ent of the
Interior in response to on-scions regarding the meaning
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tne phrr.se powers vested i.i any Ja :"n ^:oe or
tribal council by exiting 'aw" Lund in Sec Lion 13 of
the Indian R e o r ^ a n i ^ t b n -'or \VLe T er-ILw a ^ Act
of 1534 (43 Slat ??4. c-7: 25 LhS C. 1^76). the
Solicitor states as fellows:
Pe/haps the nv^t -coo principle of all I n o - a
lane supported bv a l o c of d•/••:•••-ion? hcreina'Ur
analyzed. :s t -:• pnn cop.:- \oat * -<: p.-n-c-s c c . ?
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are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not,
in acnerd, delegated powers granted by express
acts of Congress, but rather inlierent powers of
a limited sovereignty which lias never been extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins its relationship with the Federal Government as a sovereign
power, recognized as such in treaty and legislation. The powers of sovereignty have been limited from time to time by special treaties and
laws designed to take from the Indian tribes
control of matters which, in the judgment of
Congress, these tribes could no longer be safely
permitted to handle. The statutes of Congress,
then, must be examined to determine the limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or its positive content What is
not expressly limited remains within the domain
of tribal sovereignty, and therefore properly fails
within the. statutory category, "powers vested in
any InJian tribe or enbal council by cicsiiiig
law."
The acts of Congress which appear to limit
the powers of an Iridian tribe are not to be unduly extended by doubtful inference. (55 I.D.
14, 19) [First emphasis in the opinion; others

added.]
Accord, see Felix S. Cohen's, Handbook of Federal
Indian Law, p. 122 (1942) and the United States Department of the Interior's Federal Indian La-v, pp.
395-6 (195S).
Each coordinate branch of the Federal Government has recognized the existence :>f inherent tribal
sovereignty as an historical fact which enjoys continuing validity. The Court of Aopeais and the District

Court below •h1i\c> ..-.rreciiv p'emivi-d tbc?r analysis oi
the issues herein on. the e\is':ence' of such tribal sovereignty.
IV
P A S T F A I L U R E TO E X E R C I S E J U R I S DICTION OVER X O X - I X D I A X S
HAS
XOT R E S U L T E D I X T H E L O S S O F IXH E R E X T TRIBAL S O V E R E I G N POWERS RELATIXG THERETO
In the opinion entitled "Powers of Indian Tribes",
supray issued shortly after passage of the Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, Department of the Interior Solicitor MarsoJd stated as follows
regarding the vitality of the Sovereign powers of Indian tribes which had not theretofore been exercised:
It is a fact that State governments and administrative officials have frequently trespassed
upon the realm of tribal autonomy, presuming to
govern the Indian tribes through State law or
departmental regulation or arbitrary administrative fiat, but these trespasses have not impaired
the vested legal powers of local self-government
which have been recognized again and again
when these trespasses have been challenged by
an Indian tribe. "Power and authority rightfully
conferred do not necessarily cease to exist in
consequence of lone nonuser." • United States
ex rel. Stand in z Bear t\ Crock. .5 Dill. 4.53, 460).
The Wheeler-Howard A c t bv affording statutory recognition of these powers of local self-government and administrative assistance in developing adequate mechanisms for such govern-
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ment may reasonably he expected to end the
conditions that hrr t- in the pist led the Interior
Department and virions State agencies to deal
with matters that -.re properly within the legal
competence of the Indian t: ibes themselves. (o5
I.D. 14,23-29 H9%i> >.
See also KoM tv United States, supra, 91 U.S. at 73:
" [ T ] h e non-user of a power does ?jot disprove its existence/'
It has onlv been within the last few vears that
the prediction of Sohcitor Margold has been partially
realized with the approval by the Secretary of the Interior of Indian tribal codes asserting both civil and
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian
reservations and in situations Involving Indian interests.
Congress, in which resides plenary authority over the
subject matter, by such acts as the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 and the Indian Seif-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975, has provided both
implied and express recognition of, and support for,
tribal sovereignty, including criminaJ jurisdiction over
non-Indians "insofar as concern[s] their transactions on
a reservation with Indians" < United States t*. Mazurie,
supra, 419 U.S. at 558).

CONCLUSION
Amicus curiae The Ute Indian Tribe sub.nits that
the Court of -Appeals has properlv analvzed ctnd appropriately affirmed the jurisdiction of the Siiquamish
Tribe over appellants for the criminal offenses com-
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littecl by them 'w:\hiii that Tribe's reservation':" The
decision of the Court of Appeals should he affirmed.
Respectful!} submitted this 28th dav of October
1977.
Stephen G. Bo) den
Scott C. Pugslev
Attorneys for the Ute Indian Tribe,
Amicus Curiae

